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Perhaps it is no more timely than now to discuss Ekaterina Svetlova’s book on the impact of 
financial actors and their use of models on financial stability. We have just witnessed a power 
play between private investors and hedge fund managers which has resulted in temporarily 
blocking amateur investors on trading apps (BBC, 2021) and despite living with a major 
pandemic stock market values are rising, hinting at yet another financial bubble (Egan, 2021). 
These events have once again highlighted the importance of scrutinizing actions taken by 
financial institutions and explore whether models are villains, “dangerous and having the 
power to destroy markets”, or scapegoats, “harmless camouflage which is frequently used to 
hide risks emerging somewhere else” (7). Originating from a desire to challenge claims made 
after the Global Financial Crisis that the blind following of models has led to its turmoil, 
Svetlova argues for a more subtle interpretation where “insufficient models are used as one of 
many resources in the multifaceted decision-making practices of financial markets” (3). In 
brief, the argument is that while financial models have grown in importance when making 
financial decisions, these are not used in isolation but users’ emotions, judgements of the 
market and/or common institutional practices are part of the decision-making process. 
Consequently, rather than experiencing a uniform application of models, we observe a 
differentiated employment of models “contributing to the markets’ stability rather than 
destroying them” (144). To make this argument, the book is divided into two parts. In the first 
part, Svetlova undertakes a comprehensive review of the literature (Chapter 2 and 3) while the 
second part (Chapter 4 and 5) combines extensive empirical data collected in Germany and 
Switzerland with secondary data.  
The theoretical chapters are remarkable in their ability to synthesise a large, 
interdisciplinary literature on decision-making processes of actors within financial institutions. 
Integrating insights from economics, finance and sociology, the author is able to show 
limitations to the assumptions of substantive rationality and emphasize the importance of 
judgements and emotions in making financial decisions. Perhaps most importantly to note here 
is the recognition of radical uncertainty and its distinction from risk which is often marginalized 
within the economics tradition. Svetlova acknowledges that investment decisions are 
inherently linked to “non-knowledge” which not only “cannot be conceptualized as missed 
information or not-yet-knowledge” but also “cannot fully be eliminated in financial markets” 
(144). This is argued to be a necessary condition for financial markets to exist because if future 
values would be known, there would be no potential gains from differential asset values. 
Svetlova then develops an important connection to one of the limitations of financial models: 
“self-referentiality” (16) whereby models do not sufficiently take into consideration how 
present expectations and actions of market actors change future outcomes and through this 
“produce their own blind spots” (19). This is an intriguing argument as it seems to indicate, 
while not explicitly stating it, that the employment of models reinforces the creation of non-
knowledge.  
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The book’s empirical discussion is certainly of importance to the field of economics, calling 
attention to the need to develop realistic assumptions of economic theoretical viewpoints and 
challenging its dominant use of quantitative research. Svetlova rightly points out that studies 
of decision-making would greatly benefit from employing ethnographic research, in particular 
observations and in-depth interviews. The extensive qualitative research conducted by her, 
ranging from semi-structured interviews with 8 financial academics and 40 practitioners to a 
three-months long participant observation in a Swiss investment bank, enabled the author to 
debunk some of the “ways of making models work” (7) in situations of uncertainty. Rather 
than ignoring model deficiencies, Svetlova identified three unique strategies of employing 
inherently insufficient models: 1) qualitative overlay where personal judgements outweigh 
quantitative results from the model, 2) backing out/implied modelling where judgements are 
used to find out the underlying expectations in a current market forecast and develop personal 
deviations from it and 3) employing models as opinion proclaimers to portray one’s own 
opinion by adjusting its input factors. I applaud the introduction of performance acts here, 
differentiating between backstage and frontstage performance1, or in other words between 
decision-making and decision-selling. While in the backstage models are “overlaid by 
judgement” as seen in the three strategies outlined above, in the frontstage they are used as 
“instruments for staging precision” (128). Because uncertainty cannot be overcome by 
“knowledge work”2 (144) and clients expect clearly identifiable, quantified suggestions, 
financial actors provide “pseudo-knowledge” (146), that means a forecast of future outcomes 
originating from an interplay between personal judgement and financial models. Here, it is less 
important what specific actions the models suggest and more important how the numbers of 
the model can be used to sell a decision. Models thus act as “communicative tools” (121) to 
“perform (not to produce!) knowledge” (127).  
These cultures of model use, backstage and frontstage, are argued to show limitations of 
financial models being responsible for periods of financial instability. Due to the differentiated 
employment of models and bringing in one’s own judgement, they are not omni-performative 
and have not led to users blindly following their suggestions but instead model application is 
inherently creative. “For each culture, different types of unknowns are relevant and there are 
different ways of recognizing them and coping with unforeseen developments” (147). The 
process of making insufficient models work is thus never the same and is influenced by 
individual behaviour as well as institutional norms. It can be performative in the sense of 
enabling decisions in situations of uncertainty and through this changing reality but it can also 
“not produce effects, or […] produce effects opposite to what they describe” (129). As a 
consequence, Svetlova asserts that models have been wrongly accused of being villains. 
Despite being insufficient, models and the concomitant unique practices allow otherwise 
impossible decisions to be made in a radical uncertain environment.  
Now this leads me to my first point of criticism. Whereas the author rejects claims of 
“deliberate misuse of models” (110) and contends that “the term pseudo-knowledge is not 
intended to have any negative connotation” in her analysis (146), a somewhat different 
conclusion could be drawn based on the provided empirical data. An argument could be made 
that her examples indicate a rather intentional use of financial models to conceal non-
knowledge and influence market developments. Here, I would like to take up the two concepts 
introduced by Svetlova, cultures of model use and self-referentiality. Practices by financial 
actors reveal that models are employed to convince others of one’s own “subjective opinions” 
(93) about market developments and initiate investment decisions. In the backstage, opinion 
 
1 Whereas backstage refers here to internal discussions between members of a company, frontstage refers to 
situations where company members present insights to an external audience such as customers.  
2 Svetlova introduces the term knowledge work to describe the process of gaining knowledge about market 
developments, for instance, through collecting information and/or conducting more analyses. 
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proclaimers manipulate input factors so that the model “proclaims what its users think is right” 
(93) and in the front stage, models create “illusions of knowledge” (146) where situations of 
uncertainty are established as manageable situations of risk, creating a false sense of security.  
If colleagues or clients then act on this judgement, the ensuing investments change market 
outcomes, be it positive or negative. One could argue, as frequent references in the book 
suggest, that this is not a deliberate misuse but simply a result of the inherent insufficiencies 
of models such as not being able to represent reality and deal with radical uncertainty. 
Yet, the author provides evidence which contradicts this argument when discussing model 
use by credit rating agencies before the Global Financial Crisis. Here, she highlights that by 
selectively choosing the information they wanted to put more emphasis on, credit rating 
agencies “used the models to present the risks as lower than they really were” (114) and 
“maintain any rating they want[ed]” (113). While this example is given to assert that models 
are not inherently harmful but that financial agents manipulate model outcomes, it reveals how 
models are being purposefully used in shaping market outcomes. To the reader, it also does not 
become clear how models could be separated from their users, indicating a similar fallacy as 
criticised by the author where theory and practise are perceived as separate entities. This 
contradiction is then arguably overcome by asserting that like using a language “there is no 
correct way of using models” (108) and by representing staging as a mutual process where the 
client is aware of the staging process and “acts as if they trust”. Since customers are being part 
of the creation of pseudo-knowledge and “fake the willingness to trust” (126), manipulating 
models to one’s own perception is less problematic as it removes the deadlock in making 
decisions under radical uncertainty and enables financial activities. What this assumption does 
not explain is why clients would pay an advisor if they are aware that they are receiving 
knowledge illusions. It also ignores how, despite being incorrect, models, similarly to 
language, are powerful enablers in influencing decisions by others with even potentially 
detrimental effects.  
Alongside staging of “mutual non-knowledge as knowledge” (39), Svetlova refutes the 
concept of herding and its influence in creating financial bubbles based on yet another 
insufficiency of models, namely the inability to portray other market participants’ actions. 
Creating and “communicating heterogeneous types of non-knowledge” (147) is asserted to 
translate into an inability of models driving market behaviour in a coherent way. This 
conclusion seems rather hastily taken. Again, the author appears to challenge this argument 
herself by stating that advisors seek to convince clients to choose them through “feigning” 
knowledge “where there is no reliable knowledge at all” (42) and contrasting their suggestions 
to the dominant market view. Indeed, in all cultures of model use financial actors compare 
one’s own opinions to the market views. Independent of how the information is presented 
within the particular culture of model use, if judgements of the market situation are the same 
and the models are manipulated to convince others, they become tools in influencing the market 
and can enhance upward or downward movements of the market. This we have seen in the 
example of the credit rating agencies who played a dominant role in market developments 
before the financial crisis and in its aftermath, endangering financial stability in Europe. The 
distinction between models and the agents using them is thus rather problematic as it 
underestimates the power of using models in impacting market movements. 
This leads me to my second point of criticism: the missing exploration of underlying power 
relationships. While some statements hint at an unequal relationship between advisors and 
investors (“knowledge is known to one party but concealed from another” [146]) and political 
motivations being conjoined with model use (“compulsory agreement on a house view is […] 
rather politically motivated” [140]), they are quickly dispensed with since the author’s 
intention is to discuss individual decision-making processes and not systemic changes. I 
believe this view is rather challenging as we cannot separate individual behaviour from 
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institutional norms and systemic stability is dependent on sector level stability. In other words, 
micro-, meso- and macro-level dynamics are intertwined and power relationships are shaping 
these interconnections. The author herself seems to tackle with this inherent conflict between 
arguing that financial models should not be categorized as villains and their potential 
detrimental effects on economic outcomes. In the conclusion, Svetlova calls for future studies 
to pick up the role models play “as tools of staging false certainty and security” (156) and to 
provide insights into “what is concealed and why it is concealed” (147), only to then downplay 
the importance of such actions. Models are stated to be used within an environment of 
incomplete knowledge where “collective outcomes are often not intended” (156) but are 
byproducts from using inherently insufficient models which themselves produce non-
knowledge. The question remains why then use formalized, quantitative models if they cannot 
solve radical uncertainty and instead reinforce the creation of non-knowledge.  
The answer to that can be found in the increasing mathematisation of economics and its 
influence on the financial sector and its regulatory framework. Since the 1980s, we have 
experienced a substantial change in society with numerous countries deregulating financial 
markets, culminating in the financial sector growing to unprecedented levels, generating profit 
opportunities for corporations while increasing income and wealth inequality and destabilizing 
economic systems. This change was an ideological project driven by the belief that state 
intervention should be minimal and that wider access to financial markets would generate 
economic growth. Economists have been largely influential in creating this change through 
advising governments and producing ‘objective’ knowledge. Yet we can find non-disclosed 
conflicts of interests (Epstein, 2020) and discriminatory practices in knowledge production and 
dissemination, preventing methodological and theoretical diversity (Colander, 2005; Hengel, 
2017; Mearman et al., 2018). Both forces, the increasing role of economics in shaping 
regulatory changes and its underlying neoliberal ideology, challenge claims of objective 
knowledge. It is thus less surprising that even after the Global Financial Crisis, the finance 
sector was able to keep its hold on society by avoiding major regulatory forces (Epstein, 2020) 
and despite the increasing mathematisation of economics having been criticised, its formalized 
models are still perceived as acceptable knowledge in forecasting economic outcomes 
(Bresser-Pereira, 2012; Fourcade et al., 2015; Lawson, 2009). Moreover, in defiance of their 
strong influence on financial instability before and after the Global Financial Crisis and their 
conflicts of interests based on being private institutions who evaluate their own clients, credit 
rating agencies continue to exert power over economic outcomes, as evidenced in their recent 
move to consider downgrading low-income countries’ ratings, threatening their economic 
recovery (Ghosh, 2021). 
Svetlova makes such a convincing case in describing the staging process where signifiers 
associated with finance are employed to create trust and motivate action, including wearing 
expensive watches and presenting “hard science” and “objective” knowledge (124), that it is 
somewhat surprising that she has largely removed the discussion of power relations immanent 
in financial decision-making processes from her analysis. As highlighted by recent events, 
where hedge funds, despite being proponents of the free-market ideology, have incited the 
blocking of private investors and where rising stock market values have led to a substantial rise 
in wealth of high net-worth individuals while large groups of society struggle financially, a 
discussion on underlying power relationships should not be moved to the side lines. It is more 
urgent than ever to reconsider dominant forms of knowledge production and its interplay with 
everyday practices. A starting point for this agenda could be the truly interdisciplinary findings 
provided in Svetlova’s book. Her insights into cultures of model use are highly relevant in 
highlighting the importance of methodological diversity in economic research and put into 
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